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ABSTRACT
In August 2017, the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) Office launched its first operational system since ORS1. The ORS-5 (SensorSat) satellite developed in response to a 2013 United States Strategic Command
(USSTRATCOM) urgent need for space situational awareness. Developed by MIT Lincoln Labs (MITLL) the ORS5 satellite’s cost was less than $50 million. It served as a pathfinder for small satellite technology and procurement,
was the first to operate on the Multi-Mission Satellite Operations Center 2.1 (MMSOC 2.1) ground system, and was
the first commercially licensed Department of Defense (DoD) launch. The entire mission, to include the Minotaur
IV launch vehicle, was under $100 million.
In order to meet the principles of affordability combined with rapid timelines, ORS-5 relied heavily on streamlining
defense acquisition processes and documentation, exercising a series of increasing fidelity demonstrations to rapidly
assess and incorporate lessons learned, and accepting a higher risk profile to achieve success. Although ORS-5 was
a lower cost system with a higher risk profile, the stakeholder community initially expected the same standards and
risk profiles typical of larger, longer programs. As an operational prototype, ORS-5 provides key information to the
warfighter enabling more exquisite satellite systems to utilize their full capabilities. ORS-5 demonstrated operational
prototypes can meet requirements and provide value to the warfighter.
This paper documents the successes and regrets associated with acquiring this class of space vehicle and
recommends how to apply lessons learned from ORS-5 towards future rapid prototype missions.
requirements and are typically less than five pages-much shorter than traditional programs.
This
experience in developing low cost systems and
providing viable operational capability was key to the
success of the ORS-5 space situational awareness
mission.

INTRODUCTION
Founded in 2007, the Operationally Responsive Space
(ORS) Office was renamed the Space Rapid
Capabilities Office (SpRCO) at the end of 2017. Part of
the office’s congressionally mandated mission is “to
contribute to the development of low-cost, rapid
reaction payloads, busses, launch, and launch control
capabilities in order to fulfill joint military operational
requirements for on-demand space support and
reconstitution.” In order to bind program costs and still
meet rapid timelines, the Office executes its programs
under a design-to-cost philosophy using threshold
requirements rather than designing to objective
requirements typical for national security space system
developments. Under a congressional exemption to the
Joint Capability Integration and Development System
(JCIDS) used to develop and approve requirements,
United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
validates the SpRCO mission requirements. The
resulting requirements documents focus on threshold
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Started in 2014, the ORS-5 mission was in response to
a USSTRATCOM-identified urgent need for spacebased situational awareness.
The entire mission
consisting of the space vehicle, launch service, and
ground system, cost under $100 million. Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory (MITLL)
built the ORS-5 SensorSat space vehicle. It was
MITLL’s first satellite development in over 14 years.
The Office purchased a commercial launch service
from Orbital-ATK using the Minotaur IV launch
vehicle. The Minotaur IV had a long history of
successful launches but this would be the first from
Cape Canaveral. The satellite would operate on the
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Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) Advanced
Systems and Development Directorate’s (SMC/AD)
new Multi Mission Satellite Operations Center version
2.1 (MMSOC 2.1). A planned evolution from a
previous ground system, MMSOC 2.1 was capable of
operating a wide variety of spacecraft at one time and
was the foundation for AFSPC’s Enterprise Ground
Services concept. Operations began using the MMSOC
2.1 at the RDT&E Support Complex (RSC) at Kirtland
AFB and then transferred to the MMSOC 2.1 system at
Schriever AFB. During the early phase of operations, a
combination of contractors at the RSC and 1 Space
Operations Squadron (1SOPS) personnel from
Schriever AFB operated the satellite with full transition
to 1SOPS at Schriever AFB prior to operational test and
evaluation (OT&E). This was the first time 1SOPS
operated a prototype system so soon after launch.

Even with threshold requirements, system development
was not without difficulty. The developer had issues
with components from subcontractors.
The
components required design and performance trades.
As an example, the team had to make a decision on the
design of the focal plane lens construction. This
decision would either increase focal plane development
timelines or add risk to the integration of the focal
plane. The decision was to take more time in the focal
plane design and development in order to reduce the
integration risk. By making smart trades to ensure ease
of manufacturing and integration at the cost of small
performance parameters, the ORS-5 program preserved
integration and launch timelines.
While managing some risks through hardware design,
others required a different approach. Early program
reviews of MITLL ORS-5 design identified critical
weaknesses in flight software development.
In
response, the SpRCO established an independent flight
software review. The resulting approach reduced risk
by instituting a series of external and internal peer
reviews, embedding program office personnel at the
site, and integrating appropriate software builds with
increasing fidelity hardware system capability
demonstrations. This early focus led to large dividends
later in the program as the flight software team became
a strong portion of the effort. Unfortunately, they were
in high demand by both the space vehicle and ground
development activities. Based on cost trades, MITLL
opted to keep the team small. The benefit resulted in
efficiencies. The streamlined team worked quickly
through challenges in order to meet hardware
integration timelines. However, the small size of the
team often meant a function was one person deep. As
the program got closer to launch, unplanned software
drops and increasing time demands to support ground
system integration and test caused schedule delays.

Launched on August 25, 2017, the ORS-5 mission
currently provides tipping and cueing information to
space warfighters at the Joint Space Operations Center
in Vandenberg AFB, California.
SPACE VEHICLE
The space vehicle, developed and built by MITLL, was
awarded and launched in under 3 years. Key to
meeting this timeline was focusing on a stable set of
threshold systems requirements, making appropriate
system design trades, managing technical risk with
government oversight, and using a build-up test
approach. The results of the satellite development
would be a highly integrated spacecraft and built to
Class “C” standards with a three-year design life.
(Please refer to DoD HDBK 343 for definitions of
Class C.)
SpRCO programs are exempt by law from the standard
DoD requirements validation process known as JCIDS.
Under JCIDS, the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council approves program requirements. Requirements
approval can take as long as two years. Instead,
USSTRATCOM
approves
SpRCO
program
requirements. The Secretary of the Air Force, as Chair
of the ORS Executive Committee, approved the ORS-5
program on February 25, 2014. USSTRATCOM
approved the requirements on June 10, 2014. It was a
relatively short requirements document (4 pages) with
nineteen clear, concise requirements.
Those
requirements remained stable throughout the years of
development. Even though there were requests for
modifications by other stakeholders, the program office
held strong to the initial requirements set. Keeping to
the USSTRATCOM-validated performance parameters
reduced the potential for cost overruns and increased
development time.
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Pathfinders were key in reducing technical and
schedule risk during the development, integration, and
test of the vehicle. MITLL employed a robust buildup
concept and design architecture throughout spacecraft
development. On the path to the final flight vehicle,
MITLL developed a spacecraft representative FlatSat
and an Engineering Design Unit (EDU).
The FlatSat was a high-fidelity representation of the
flight vehicle laid out on a table. The FlatSat used
flight-representative spacecraft hardware including the
avionics subsystem to represent form and function of
the flight vehicle as opposed to using flight simulators.
Using the FlatSat, the contractor thoroughly tested
subsystems and the flight software without impacting
the schedule of the EDU or flight hardware. This
approach yielded high confidence when introducing
2
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new software builds to the EDU and flight units. With
ORS-5 satellite now in operations, the team continues
to use the FlatSat to test software changes before
uploading to the operational spacecraft.

orbit and inclination, the Minotaur IV launched from
Cape Canaveral. The contract was firm fixed price
(FFP), low cost ($23.6M), with a 4 month launch
window starting 15 May 2017. Orbital ATK was
responsible for range safety, scheduling and operations,
procuring a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
commercial launch license, and launch vehicle mission
assurance.
Since this was a launch service,
government-unique mission assurance was minimized
to the maximum extent possible. The SpRCO spent
another $5M for the refurbished ICBM motors and
associated mission assurance.

MITLL treated their EDU like flight hardware using a
“test like you fly” mentality for assembly, integration
and test. The EDU was a pathfinder to verify primary
structure assembly techniques. Once assembled, the
EDU served as the test article to produce the testverified finite element model taking the flight vehicle
out of the coupled loads analysis schedule. Removing
the flight vehicle from the critical path allowed for
parallel work and risk reduction activities without
risking final flight hardware. MITLL also put the EDU
through a full environmental test campaign to find
issues early in the program. Lessons learned from
testing the EDU refined assembly and test procedures
for the flight hardware. This led to a highly successful
and streamlined flight unit environmental test
campaign. The approach was a culture shift for the
government technical oversight team; it led to some
resistance and uneasiness. The government’s primary
concern was additional schedule margin consumed in
the EDU test phase was better spent on the flight unit
test campaign. With only one data point, an accurate
assessment of such a strong emphasis on EDU testing is
difficult, but it is worthwhile to explore further.

This mission was the first Minotaur IV launch from
Cape Canaveral on a launch complex unused since
January 1999. As the first Minotaur IV launch from
Cape Canaveral, new challenges faced the launch team.
For example, Orbital-ATK had to revise procedures to
operate at the Cape. In addition, 45th Space Wing range
and safety personnel were unfamiliar with the Minotaur
series with the extra variation of it being a commercial
launch service. To mitigate these challenges, OrbitalATK and the SMC launch management team
(SMC/LEX) conducted a pathfinder mission in
February 2017. The mission consisted of shipping a
simulated launch vehicle and motors from Vandenberg
AFB to the Cape and simulating stacking the stages of
the vehicle. They used the pathfinder to refine vehicle
stacking, launch and safety procedures as well as assess
any potential issues with the logistics of bringing the
vehicle onto the range.

Successes:
- Stable requirements baseline ensured developers
stayed on track

The launch complex, LC-46, had not been used in
nearly 20 years and required extensive refurbishment to
support the ORS-5 satellite launch. Space Florida, an
organization created by Florida’s Department of
Transportation to expand and develop its space
industry, managed the overhaul of the state-owned site.
LC-46 needed a great deal of work to overcome
corrosion issues, upgrade electrical systems, and
improve communication networks. Space Florida
successfully managed the effort from beginning to end.
However, neither Space Florida nor the program office
had funds to add lightning protection at the site.

- Pathfinders for the integration and test campaign
were instrumental to maintain schedule
- The Engineering Design Unit was key in identifying
issues in spacecraft design
- FlatSat allowed quick mitigation of flight software
discrepancies and user interface issues
LAUNCH VEHICLE
The launch vehicle was perhaps the least difficult part
of the effort, but the team discovered new challenges
during the weeks and days leading to launch. Given the
small size of the SpRCO, the Office decided to
purchase a commercial launch service to leverage
industry best practices with respect to vehicle
development and mission assurance.
However,
launching a Minotaur IV for the first time at the Cape
from a launch pad not used in almost 20 years and the
associated range impacts added its own issues.

Given that the launch was to be in August, lightning
was highly likely. There was sufficient protection on
the mobile service tower, but once it rolled back,
exposing the launch vehicle, no protection remained.
All options for temporary lightning protection were too
expensive. To mitigate the lightning protection issue,
the team conceived a plan to roll the pad over the
launch vehicle during times when lightning was close to
the area. The team extensively practiced the procedures
during the February 2017 pathfinder with 45th Space
Wing Safety personnel observing. Using the pathfinder

The SpRCO purchased a commercial service from
Orbital ATK. To get the spacecraft to the appropriate
Punjani
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- Lightning protection system would have reduced
launch vehicle processing risks

results, the launch integration team developed the
requisite procedures. However, a month prior to
launch, the 45 Space Wing levied additional lightning
mitigation safety measures. Individuals working on the
pad had to evacuate when lightning warnings occurred.

GROUND SYSTEM
In the excitement of launch, we have a tendency to
forget that launch is only the prologue. The story
begins when the ground talks to the satellite for the first
time and after testing, sends data to the warfighter.
Ground systems can be just as challenging as the space
vehicle when it comes to development. In the early
days of the then-ORS Office, ORS worked with SMC
Space Development and Test Wing (so named at the
time) on the first instantiation of the Multi-Mission
Space Operations Center at Kirtland and Schriever AFB
for ORS-1 flight operations. Based on the success of
that effort, the SpRCO continued its partnership with
the now known as SMC/AD. ORS-5 was the first
mission to operate on the new MMSOC 2.1 ground
system. Operations started at Kirtland’s RSC and
transferred to SOC-11 at Schriever AFB. MMSOC 2.1
was the first version to use NASA Ames’s Goddard
Mission Service Evolution Center (GMSEC) service
bus, designed to integrate software applications and
services onto a common platform for all missions to
use. ORS-5 utilized the Neptune Tracking Telemetry
and Control (TT&C) platform, developed by Space
Ground System Solutions (SGSS) for the Naval
Research Laboratory, with the Optical Processing
Architecture at Lincoln (OPAL) mission unique
software created by MITLL. While MMSOC 2.1
leveraged earlier MMSOC developments, schedule and
development risk was still moderate due to necessary
hardware and software changes.

Florida weather affected both stacking and day of
launch operations. Once stacking began, multiple
delays to integration occurred due to lightning
warnings. In order to minimize the impacts to the
launch vehicle processing timeline, the launch
integration team worked in the very early morning
hours when chances for lightning were lowest. By
being flexible with work hours and with support from
the entire team, the launch vehicle successfully
processed and delivered on time. Lightning continued
to be an issue on the day of launch with multiple storms
in the area.
The evacuation distances made it
challenging to get back to the pad to complete final prelaunch steps.
Lightning protection was not the only concern. Despite
the February 2017 pathfinder and regular range
operations working group meetings addressing a
number of issues for this first time launch, engagements
with 45 Space Wing personnel in the days prior made it
clear that there were some gaps in understanding the
Minotaur IV requirements. The range setup needed to
be adapted for the launch pad (cameras to confirm pad
liftoff and other obscure corrections). This was not
identified until days before launch. Incorrectly
interpreted interface documents delayed reviews. The
range, launch and program office teams persevered.
After a short lightning-free window, they were able to
roll back the tower in less than 15 minutes and launch
on 26 August 2017.

By February 2017, MMSOC 2.1 development was well
underway, but the pending launch coupled with the start
of the operations training campaign increased pressure
on the ground systems development team. Since
development was in progress, interface documents were
immature and constantly changing. Both Neptune and
OPAL were already in use by other missions, but the
uniqueness of MMSOC 2.1 made integrating the
systems a challenge. Any time there was a flight
software change on OPAL (which occurred three times
from February through May 2017) there was a waterfall
effect changing how Neptune ingested the data in turn
changing how MMSOC 2.1 processed the data.

Successes:
- On time launch at low cost
- Flexible and motivated team allowed for launch
vehicle processing outside of normal work hours
- Team overcame last minute obstacles in order to
ensure an on-time launch
Regrets:
- Better communication with launch range could have
mitigated lightning and interface issues

Integration and testing changes was no trivial matter.
The MMSOC 2.1 build out at the RSC required the
developers to integrate and test each software drop
sequentially through three suites. It began with the
development/integration suite, followed by the test
suite, and finally the operational suite. Information
assurance
accreditation
purposes
drove
this
methodology. Each suite added new layers of cyber

- Roles/responsibilities between program office,
contractors, range, safety were not well defined
- Needed to bring in 45 Launch Group to act as a
liaison to the range and safety office
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protection causing configuration changes with each
suite. Thus, passing one suite did not mean clear
sailing through the subsequent suites. The integration
team had to trouble-shoot issues at each level. In some
cases, cyber protection layers locked out entire
functions adding even more time to the tight integration
schedule. Sending MMSOC 2.1 laptops to the software
developers and installing a long line from MITLL to the
RSC mitigated it to some extent. The teams used
telecons when needed, but they were a poor substitute.
Key mission members from SGSS and MITLL had to
sit, in person, side by side with the MMSOC 2.1
developers to work through various deficiencies. As
mentioned in the space vehicle section, this was
challenging because the teams were small and did not
always have the needed availability.

Successes:
- Alternate FCT approach allowed a commanding test
to meet schedule constraints
- MMSOC 2.1 developments on ORS-5 set the success
for future Air Force spacecraft missions
Regrets:
- Concurrent development on all software platforms
increased timelines for integration
- Small, geographically separated software teams not
often available for integration activities
- Not streamlining integration through the RSC suites
- Long-line requirements and process not fully
understood by all stakeholders

Scheduled for a March 2017 Factory Capability Test,
MMSOC 2.1 was still in the middle of development and
in the final stages of integration. The purpose of the
Factory Compatibility Test was to prove MMSOC 2.1
could command the spacecraft through an air gap via
the Air Force Satellite Control Network. While not an
ideal time for the test, the program office accepted the
additional risk to meet schedule constraints. A van
simulating the Air Force Satellite Control Network
deployed to MITLL near Hanscom Air Force Base in
Massachusetts. There were some initial challenges with
the test van set up. The contract was new, and
documentation changeover was still in progress. At
over two weeks, the test took longer than expected, but
it provided useful discovery. MMSOC 2.1 could not
command ORS-5. Root cause investigation revealed an
incompatibility issue with a MMSOC 2.1 subsystem.
The fix was a software change. Unfortunately, the
schedule constraint still existed, and the AFSCN
simulator van was not available in time. The SpRCO
ORS-5 team developed an alternate test procedure. In
May 2017, a team member piped recorded spacecraft
data through the Eastern Vehicle Checkout Facility
(EVCF) at Cape Canaveral to check commanding from
MMSOC. While test fidelity decreased, it confirmed
commanding, and the program office gained the
necessary confirmation to ship the spacecraft to the
launch integration facility.

OPERATIONS
At program inception, the 3rd Space Experimentation
Squadron (3SES) was to operate the ORS-5 mission at
SAFB. This organization has a heritage of accepting
new “one-off” missions and adapting to various
operational challenges. Program plans included 3SES
developing all training products and procedures and
conducting all exercises and rehearsals necessary for
Launch and Early Orbit (L&EO) and day to day
operations rather than contractors. Because the mission
supported space situational awareness, AFSPC A2/3/6
proposed re-assigning ORS-5 to 1SOPS who operated
similar missions. Leaders from AFSPC, 50th Space
Wing, SpRCO, and SMC/AD discussed the pros and
cons of the reassignment. Unfortunately, the team did
not fully assess the secondary impacts: training,
operating culture, and ground system build-out. Unlike
3SES, 1SOPS was not accustomed to operating
prototype systems right after launch. They did not have
sufficient personnel or experience to develop the
training materials or train their initial cadre. In
addition, they were used to a longer, more detailed
training campaign and had little experience with
developmental ground systems. Finally, the original
plan for Schriever AFB was to leverage earlier version
MMSOC hardware, wiring, and facility space at 3SES.
These would no longer be available. All of these
factors would have schedule, cost, and stakeholder
impacts.

Development on MMSOC 2.1 continued after shipment
of the vehicle, as the system demonstrated signs of
instability. Reboots of the system were common until
the development team burned down solutions to various
problems. This high pace of development and test
activity continued until two weeks prior to launch. At
that point, the system was stable and successfully
supported the 26 August launch.
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Training began in February 2017, but the
developmental ground system was unavailable to
present any semblance of a user interface. Operators
scheduled training exercises every other month; many
cancelled due to system unavailability. Continued
developmental delays and training impacts led to a
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growing operator distrust of the system. At the request
of 1SOPS, the SpRCO funded contractor operators
from the RSC (Space Test and Engineering Contract
[STEC]) to develop training materials and operating
procedures. STEC also supported classroom and hands
on training. STEC had limited time to interact with the
new system and its changes making training
development more challenging. While a training
simulator would have eased the training campaign, it
was not an ORS-5 requirement and not funded. AFSPC
had no additional funds to support operations and
training activities.

planned transfer of the system to SAFB slipped from
October 2017 to March 2018. Because there was no
secure data connectivity from the RSC to the 18th
Space Control Squadron, the warfighter did not get the
data as early as planned.
Due to delays in the ground system transfer to
Schriever AFB, operations had to continue at Kirtland
AFB with contractor operators for four months after the
original date in November 2017. To support, the
program office had to re-allocate funds, and SMC/AD
reprioritized those contractor operators from other
missions. During this time, the contractor operators
were able to make advances in automation.
Automation was not a program requirement but a
request from 1SOPS to assist with manning concerns.
With this automation, the contractor operators at the
RSC were able to test the mission as a lights-out
operation and work day shifts with minimal personnel.
This allowed program costs to stay low and reallocation
of contractors to upcoming missions.

Because early training was unsuccessful, compressed
scheduling for the operations readiness campaign was
four months from May-August 2017. The spacecraft
had shipped to the launch base by this time so the flight
software was stable reducing the impact to ground
system software baselines. This allowed the trainers to
develop procedures and understand the user interface.
Executing quickly to certify team members prior to
launch, MITLL subject matter experts, 1SOPS, and
SMC personnel combined events. During this time, it
was imperative to work on relationship building
between the ground system developers, contractor
operators/trainers, government program team, and
1SOPS community. This took time. A lot of trust was
lost with the system delays and lack of readiness for
training events. All sides made compromises, and
everyone rallied towards a single goal--launch. The
team was ready, the operators contacted the spacecraft
during its first orbit, and the team was able to
troubleshoot and resolve issues with the AFSCN.

ORS-5 satellite control transferred from the SpRCO to
1SOPS on March 17, 2018 after operator training on the
changes to the system, mission data verification, and a
successful shadow operations period. The system
entered Operational Test (OT) conducted by the 17 Test
Squadron (17TS). Operator buy-in and trust at this
point was critical to the program success. 1SOPS
quickly advocated for the program to the 17TS on the
acceptability of workarounds and operator impacts,
which kept OT on track. After OT, the system entered a
30-day trial period on April 22, 2018. The team
installed automation scripts and additional OPAL
tuning and data exploitation tools during this time.

During the L&EO campaign at Kirtland AFB,
development focus shifted to the MMSOC 2.1 system
at SAFB’s SOC-11. Due to parts obsolescence,
SMC/AD purchased and installed “soft” front-end
processors (FEPs) which employed virtual machines to
ingest and process data. SMC/AD re-designed this
system as MMSOC2.1v. While the new FEPs initially
appeared to be a minor change, they were not. The
new equipment required more changes to the MMSOC
2.1v, Neptune, and OPAL software. There were new
integration challenges for the developers to overcome
requiring the same level of face-to-face communication
experienced during MMSOC 2.1 development at
Kirtland AFB. It became clear there was a need to have
a technical expert who understood each piece of
mission software. One example was troubleshooting
two-line element set (TLE) and timing issues on the
ground system. A Neptune expert was only available
with limited phone support. After struggling for several
weeks, the team discovered the issues were procedural
caused by a lack of understanding of how Neptune
software worked. As the L&EO campaign ended, the
Punjani

On 31 May 2018, AFPSC operationally accepted the
ORS-5 system and declared Initial Operational
Capability.
Successes:
- RSC contractor operators adapted and supported
increased requirements for training and procedure
development
- Operators made successful first contact with the
spacecraft
- Automation development mitigated operator manning
challenges
- Operator buy in and trust enabled successful L&EO
and OT
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Regrets:

response to an urgent need for space-based situational
awareness. The first space vehicle to operate on
MMSOC 2.1 at Kirtland AFB and then Schriever AFB,
ORS-5 currently provides data to warfighters in the
Joint Space Operations Center at Vandenberg AFB.
The three-year timeline from approval to proceed and
launch drove a higher risk posture for system design
and operations transition. While the team mitigated
some design risks by maintaining a stable requirements
base and using a series of increasing fidelity system
demonstrations, the SpRCO actively managed other
risks throughout program execution and into launch
integration. Due to parts obsolescence-driven hardware
changes, the ground system team lost time because
lessons learned from the Kirtland AFB development did
not fully apply to Schriever AFB. A seemingly minor
change in operating squadron compounded this further.
Both factors had second order effects increasing
program costs and schedule after launch. As space
prototype missions become more frequent, it is
important to understand how to apply the following
successes and regrets to future small, rapid programs.

- Impacts to the change in operational squadron not
fully assessed
- Lack of secure data line at Kirtland AFB delayed
early use of data to customer
- Processes and procedures were not delivered in time
to support early training sessions as it was still
unknown how the system would operate
- Expectation management and risk acceptance at
senior operator level
- Different configurations between the RSC and SAFB
COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDERS
ORS-5 was a new type of mission for many
stakeholders who were used to large ACAT-I type
programs with five to ten years of development prior to
launch.
The ORS-5 program frequently pushed
stakeholders from AFSPC headquarters, operators, and
other SMC functional organizations outside their
comfort zones. Even though this was a relatively low
cost Class “C” space system, many did not understand
or agree with the level of risk taken throughout program
execution and transition to operations.
Program
documentation tailoring required a lot of coordination
and discussions on what was appropriate. Additional
reviews and higher-level coordination inappropriate for
a $100 million prototype mission took months of
program time. Complicating matters, as community
stakeholder personnel swapped out, discussions and
coordination started over. For a small program office,
this was costly exercise. Plans are currently underway
at AFSPC to develop streamlined processes and
documentation for prototype systems.

Importance of the data. In retrospect, the primary goal
was to get data to the user. There were many delays
getting that data to the user--time spent exploring trade
space on launch vehicles, changing operational
squadrons, and not installing the appropriate secure data
lines to the RSC. If the focus had remained on the data,
then those decisions may have had a different outcome.
Consider the number of variables. The ground system
had many pieces in concurrent development adding
risks carried up to launch integration.
When
developing prototypes, choose a focus--the spacecraft,
the ground system, launch vehicle, etc. Choose what to
invest time and resources in developing and keep the
rest of the system as stable and simple as possible.

Success:

Tailoring needs to stick. If small satellite programs and
prototypes require tailoring of processes from ACAT I
systems, then the tailoring needs to stick and endure
through personnel changes. While tailoring streamlines
the process later, it takes time up front to work through
stakeholder equities. Ideally, formal guidance on how
to handle these types of programs would accomplish the
tailoring once for all following programs.

- Set the template for developing and transitioning
future operational prototype systems
Regrets:
- HQ guidance to expedite demonstration/prototype
mission onboarding was insufficient
- Stakeholders not of the same risk mindset for small
programs

Cultural mindset for small satellites need to change. In
other domains, the Air Force fields small acquisition
programs quickly. The same needs to be true for space
systems.
Stakeholders continue to advocate for
processes for which they are familiar, usually ACAT I
size programs. The paradigm needs to change if the Air
Force plans to launch small satellites more rapidly in
the future at lower cost. Taking more risk on these

- Tailoring needs to be approved at appropriate levels
and continued through personnel changes
CONCLUSION
On August 26, 2017, the SpRCO launched the ORS-5
SensorSat on a Minotaur IV from Cape Canaveral in
Punjani
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programs makes sense. The consequence of loss is not
as severe as with an ACAT I system. The lessons
gleaned are valuable.
Balance the high risk with the exquisite. Small satellites
and prototypes can provide a huge boost to mission
areas, but they do not eliminate the need for exquisite
capabilities. Both types complement each other and can
work together to ensure resiliency across mission areas.
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